

Mundane Consumption and the Self: A Social-Identity Perspective

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The self—a sense of who and what we are—is suggested as an organizing construct through which people's everyday activities can be understood. Life's mundane tasks and the consumer behaviors necessary to enact them are cast in a perspective of self little used by consumer psychologists—social-identity theory. Two structural modeling studies in support of the perspective are reported. The results of the first one imply that people use products to enact one of their social identities and that products relate only indirectly to the overall or global self. The second study indicates that the frequency with which activities are performed depends on the salience of the identity they represent and that such salience, in turn, depends on several enabling factors. Taken together, the studies provide theoretical support for the common-sense notion that we are attracted to products that are consistent with, and that enable the enactment of, the various social identities which make up our sense of self; the more important an identity to us, the more attractive its associated products.

The idea of a “fit” between products and consumers has pervaded marketing thought and practice for some time. Assertions like “a BMW is my kind of car” or “she looks terrific in DKNY clothes” express the belief that people are most comfortable with products that are in some sense congruent with their selves (Belk, 1988; Sirgy, 1982; Zinkhan & Hong, 1991) or personalities (Holbrook, 1992).

In spite of this notion's intuitive appeal, however, consumer researchers have had little statistical success in demonstrating a strong association between people and the products they choose (Kassarjian, 1971). We believe this frus-

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trating failure can be traced in part to an insufficient conceptualization of the relation in question. Specifically, the self has been modeled as an indivisible entity (rather than as a composite of facets collectively defining a person), and this molar construal masks the underlying relation that people's possessions have to individual parts of their selves or personalities.

We seek to portray the people-products relation more clearly through a perspective little used in consumer psychology, social-identity theory. We present two structural-modeling studies which suggest that: (a) products relate functionally to people through one of their specific identities, and only indirectly through their global or overall self; and (b) the salience or importance of an identity to people drives them to enact its behavior, using identity-associated products. (This salience, in turn, is driven by several enabling factors.) Together, these studies imply that the significance of a product to consumers depends on *which* of their identities it enables and the *importance* of that identity—what it contributes to their overall sense of self.

SELF-EXPRESSION IN DAILY LIFE

It should be emphasized at the outset that the *ordinary* products we use in day-to-day living are self-expressive. What to have for breakfast, what to wear to work, and whether to read or watch TV tonight are not dramatic considerations, but they present us with self-product congruity issues nonetheless. So what we consume, in the performance of even mundane activities, both contributes to and reflects our sense of identity—our sense of who and what we are (Belk, 1988; Holbrook, 1992; Kernan & Sommers, 1967; Kleine, Kleine, & Kernan, 1992; Solomon, 1983).

The Self as a Construct

The origin of self as a psychological construct is usually attributed to James (1890), who distinguished between the *knower* (self as *I*) and the *known* (self as *Me*), although Mead (1934) also made much the same distinction. In this conception, the *I* is the thinking, behavior-influencing agency, whereas the *Me* is a collection of components—the material (our bodies and possessions), the inner (our attitudes), and the social (our identities as parent, friend, union member)—which can be recognized by ourselves and others.¹ Ontologically, the self reflects Sartre's (1943/1956) three states of existence (being, having, and doing) in the sense that one "is" (has being) by virtue of what one does (which requires possessions, or "having"). It is in this products-enabling behavior sense that consumption is considered self-relevant.

¹As one of our reviewers reminded us, the philosophical question of whether the self *can* be known remains in dispute (see Kripke, 1982, especially pp 114–145)

Social psychologists have approached the I–Me relation with somewhat different emphases. Those of a *psychological* orientation (the disciplinary bent of most consumer psychologists) have focused largely on the I and how it influences behavior (for a summary, see Wylie, 1979). In contrast, those of a *sociological* orientation have focused more on the Me, as an effect of a person's behavior (for a review, see Backman, 1983). As emphasized by symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 1969; Mead, 1934; Solomon, 1983; Stryker, 1980), the self behaves according to the meaning it derives from continuous encounters with its symbolic environment, which consists of objects and people (including oneself), and it comes to have being in the process. Any deficiencies in the Me's resultant being receive our particular attention (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982).

Social-Identity Theory and the Self

Consistent with the traditional pleas to study consumers *in situ* (e.g., Boyd & Levy, 1963; Douglas & Isherwood, 1979; Kernan & Sommers, 1967; Wells, 1993), social-identity theory conceptualizes consumer behavior as it occurs naturally. It focuses on three ideas that underpin daily life (Kleine et al., 1992): (a) that most of it constitutes doing (eating, sleeping, working, recreating); (b) that this doing requires having (possessions); and (c) that such having/doing is largely social in nature (our behavior is influenced by the physical or symbolic presence of others). What is “natural” about all this is its emphasis on activities—coherent behavior patterns directed at the achievement of identity-related goals, such as preparing a meal or attending a religious service. Products inevitably come into play, but they are regarded for their instrumental, activity-enabling character, rather than as ends in themselves (Boyd & Levy, 1963).² Moreover, people usually consider products in complementary sets or constellations; a specific item's significance reflects its contribution to some totality which enables an activity pattern's enactment (McCracken, 1988; Solomon, 1988; Sommers & Kernan, 1965). Finally, we come to know which products enable which activities by observing other people's behavior and by interpreting their reactions to ours. For example, we learn that to be a softball player requires the use of a ball and a bat, certain shoes and clothing, and so forth.

People's activities and enabling possessions are organized around their *social identities*—the multifaceted labels by which their Me is recognized by themselves and members of society. (Identities differ from *traits*, such as ag-

²Although consumer researchers commonly distinguish utilitarian versus symbolic consumption, symbolic interactionist theory makes no such distinction and views all social phenomena as symbolic (Mead, 1934; Solomon, 1983). The instrumentality of consumption, in this view, derives from its symbolic *and* utilitarian characteristics. Kleine and Kernan (1991) made a similar point

gressiveness or honesty, in that the latter characterize *how* someone behaves within an identity.) Social identities (accountant, golfer, parent) are derived from social roles, but they are not the same as roles. Roles are consensual prescriptions, behaviors expected of those occupying a particular position in society (Young, 1991), and in that sense they partition a society. Identities, in contrast, partition a person. If a society is the sum of all its enacted positions (roles), an individual is the sum of all his or her enacted identities (Burke & Reitzes, 1981; Sarbin & Allen, 1968; Stryker, 1980). Social-identity theory makes symbolic interactionism more tractable in two ways. First, by focusing on the social nature of the activity pattern-product cluster relation, it portrays how people learn self-fulfilling behavior (Goffman, 1959). Second, by decomposing the global self into its distinct identities, it elucidates which facets of a person's Me are reflected in various products (through activities) and in that sense tells us more about who he or she "is."

Identities, Global Self, and Possessions

Consistent with previous consumer research (e.g., Belk, 1988; Sirgy, 1982), social-identity theory predicts a connection between one's sense of self and one's possessions. *Identity-related possessions* form a coherent set around each identity. These identity-related possessions are the things an individual perceives to be useful for enacting the associated identity. This personal and idiosyncratic set of possessions contrasts with the stereotypical set of things linked to the corresponding role (e.g., Solomon, 1988; Solomon & Assael, 1987). For example, the possessions an individual uses for gardening may differ from those associated with the typical gardener.

Recent empirical findings show a greater correspondence between conduct and its relevant identity than with the global self (Burke & Reitzes, 1981; Griffin, Chassin, & Young, 1981; Mboya, 1989; Mintz & Muller, 1977). Shavelson and Bolus's (1982) results, for example, support a multifaceted self-concept. They found that English-class performance was most associated with students' English self-concepts, next most with their academic self-concept, and least associated with the global self. Furthermore, this greater correspondence between identity and behavior generalizes across cultures (Song & Hattie, 1984). We extend these findings to the consumption setting and propose that a stronger relation exists between one of a person's identities and the possessions corresponding with that identity (path A in Figure 1) than with the global self (path B). This also implies that people have many *extended* selves, one corresponding to each of the identities included in their global self. This contrasts with Belk's (1988) position that we have but a single extended self.

The social roles we ascribe to ourselves are the basis of our social identities, and, collectively, these identities form our global self—our overall sense of




FIGURE 1 A priori relations among schemas identity, identity-related possessions, global self, identity ideal, and role. Values are standardized parameter estimates with *t* statistics in parentheses

who we are. Path C in Figure 1 shows that the identity (along with many other identities) goes toward making up the global self. This identity-to-global self path operationalizes social-identity theory’s guiding premise that one’s overall sense of self derives from the particular identities that one enacts and ascribes to one’s self (Burke & Reitzes, 1981; Burke & Tully, 1977; McCall & Simmons, 1978; Sarbin & Allen, 1968; Stryker, 1980). A reciprocal, global self-to-identity effect (if included in Figure 1) would represent the facilitating or constraining effects that other identities in a person’s global self have on a particular identity. People normally strive to coordinate their identities. To the extent that the global self maintains some degree of internal consistency, there may be an effect of global self on identity. However, this reciprocal effect should be weaker than the effect of identities on global self because, according to social-identity theory, external social influences are more important than internal processes in determining who we are.

Identities Versus Identity Ideals Versus Role Stereotypes

Each of our identities exists at a “real” level (e.g., what a person actually does when he or she goes fishing) and at an “ideal” one (e.g., how a person would like to be as a fisherman; cf. Sirgy, 1982; Zinkhan & Hong, 1991). A person’s primary guide for enacting a particular identity is its corresponding social role

(Hawkins, Best, & Coney, 1992; Sarbin & Allen, 1968; Solomon, 1983; Young, 1991). Because too great a disparity between norms and actual behavior can be a source of anxiety, the role's prescriptions guide one's enactment of the derived identity (e.g., how to behave as a bowler). Path D in Figure 1 represents this influence of role on identity.

There is some evidence that an identity might be guided by an ideal distinct from the corresponding social role. Previous consumer research shows that a single personal ideal can apply to the wholistic self (e.g., Sirgy, 1982; Zinkhan & Hong, 1991). However, Greeno, Sommers, and Kernan's (1973) study revealed that personalized ideals exist for each identity included in the self. Chassin, Zeiss, Cooper, and Reaven's (1985) findings suggest further that there is an important difference between shared norms for a social role (e.g., typical husband) and what is ideal for a particular person (e.g., an *individual's* sense of an ideal husband). One might not wish to enact an identity as he or she is "supposed to" for a variety of reasons (values, abilities, desire to be different). Yet, one may have a personal, perhaps more realistic, ideal configuration for the identity. This identity ideal can provide a perspective to inspire future-directed activities, similar in effect to a possible or dynamic self (Markus & Wurf, 1987; A. Morgan, 1993). Path E in Figure 1, from ideal to identity, depicts this speculative hypothesis.

Identity ideals tend not to be too distant from the norms of their social roles because they (like real identities) derive from those social roles; one cannot flout social expectations *and* expect to be treated congenially. Society, as reflected by the role prescriptions, constrains the ideal. Path F in Figure 1 depicts this hypothesized influence of role on identity ideal.

The foregoing entities—social identities (e.g., how I am as a parent, including the products used for that enactment), identity ideals (how I would be as a parent ideally), social roles (how I perceive the typical parent), and the global self (who I am given the various identities I enact)—all exist in our minds in the form of schemas. For each identity (and role, etc.) there is an identity *schema* (role schema, etc.), which represents the person's store of identity-related knowledge—a collection of what-to-do information (derived from social interaction) when expressing an identity (such as bus driver). The nature and functions of schemas are well documented in the literature (e.g., Brewer & Nakamura, 1984; Markus, 1977; Shank & Abelson, 1977; Srull, Lichtenstein, & Rothbart, 1985; Taylor & Crocker, 1981; Thorndyke & Yekovich, 1980) and, as Mick (1988) noted, their position in consumer psychology is well established—particularly regarding social cognition and information processing. Thus, all these entities are connected through a *mental* structure, through a relation among their schemas. The way we negotiate life's daily tasks depends on how we *think* about ourselves and our place in society; the feedback we get from social interaction (and from our own introspection) is filtered through the mental structure of our schemas.

STUDY 1: SCHEMA RELATIONS

Study 1 investigated our hypothesized relations among five schemas of individuals: (a) for a particular one of their identities, (b) for the possessions related to that identity, (c) for the identity's ideal, (d) for the role on which the identity is based, and (e) for the individual's global self (see Figure 1). The social identity chosen for this purpose was that of *athlete*. This generic term refers to an identity that people might ascribe to themselves as a consequence of engaging in some kind of activity which can be labeled (e.g., "I cycle," "I play softball," "I lift weights"). The identity does not carry the implications of the trait "athletic," inasmuch as a person can be very accomplished or quite inept as he or she engages in such activities. For analytic purposes, the kind of athlete (bowler, jogger) is not important, because our primary concern is to study the structural relations among people's schemas. In fact, any identity could have served our purpose; we chose that of athlete because it is a popular one among our college-student subjects.

Method

A total of 145 subjects, undergraduate students at Arizona State University, took part in Study 1, which was presented to them as a "college student athletic participation" questionnaire. Class credit, but no money, was given for participation.

Operationalization and measurement of the schemas followed the procedures developed originally by Osgood (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957), updated by Burke (Burke & Reitzes, 1981; Burke & Tully, 1977), and refined by Hoelter (1985). In this construal, schemas are regarded as semantic representations of self-defining meanings; accordingly, they are mapped in a common semantic space, using identical scales for each schema. We chose the "activity" dimension (Osgood et al., 1957) to represent this space because it is appropriate to athletic activities and it has been found useful in previous research (Hoelter, 1985). These 7-point scales (some of which were reversed on the questionnaire) measured each schema: active-inactive, aggressive-passive, agitated-calm, fast-slow, restless-quiet, vibrant-still, and vigorous-relaxed. The Appendix details the carefully pretested instructions used to elicit each schema.

The global self schema was elicited first. Subjects were then instructed to focus their thoughts on a single athletic activity in which they participate. Activities elicited include basketball, bicycling, golf, gymnastics, hiking, rollerblading, running, and weightlifting. Subjects then described their identity schema, the corresponding role schema, the identity-ideal schema, and, finally, their identity-related possessions schema. All schema measures appeared on

different pages of a packet and were separated by other measures in the questionnaire, except for the identity-ideal and role schema measures, which appeared on the same page. Although possible response consistency across the different schema measures may have inflated associations between some of the measures, we believe that such problems were minimal.

Results

Subjects differ greatly in the length of time over which they have cultivated their athlete identity. They reported doing activities related to this identity for as little as 1 month and up to 25 years ($M = 8.36$ years, $SD = 6.25$ years). Eighty-nine percent reported doing activities related to their athlete identity at least once in the past 4 weeks. They claimed an average 5.5 ($SD = 4.1$) identity-related possessions.

Data analysis followed Anderson and Gerbing's (1988) two-step procedure. First, a maximum-likelihood confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was performed on the covariance matrix to assess and purify the measurement structure.³ (We expected common method variance because the five schemas were measured with the same activity-dimension scales, so the error terms associated with identically worded scales were permitted to covary to partition out this variance; see Bagozzi & Yi, 1991; Kenny & Kashy, 1992; Marsh, 1990. The correlations between all other residuals were fixed at zero.) Four items emerged as acceptable indicators for the five schemas: active-inactive, aggressive-passive, fast-slow, and vibrant-still. Cronbach's alpha, averaged across the five schemas, was .78. (As a correlated-errors model was fit to the schema data, interpretation of this descriptive statistic is problematic; Bollen, 1989). Overall model fit of this CFA model proved excellent, $\chi^2(120) = 112.9$, $p = .66$, adjusted goodness of fit (AGFI) = .88, Bollen's $\Delta_2 = 1.0067$.⁴ The residuals were distributed normally, and only two of them exceeded 2.0. Table 1 presents the parameter estimates for this measurement model.

Step 2 in our procedure was to test (simultaneously) the hypothesized relations among the five schemas. To do this, the CFA model was modified to incorporate the hypothesized structural relations between the schemas (see Figure 1). Each schema was measured by the four indicators identified through

³All covariance structure analyses reported in this article were performed by analyzing a covariance matrix with the LINEQS subroutine of the Statistical Analysis System's (1990; Version 6 06) Proc CALIS

⁴The CFA model was also estimated without the common method variance partitioned out (i.e., with no correlations permitted between the residuals of identically worded items) The overall fit of this model, $\chi^2(160) = 342.6$, $p < .0001$, AGFI = .74, $\Delta_2 = 8218$, was significantly worse than that of the a priori measurement model, $\chi^2_d(40) = 229.7$, $p < .0001$, however, which supports our a priori decision to model the common method variance

TABLE 1
Study 1 CFA of Five Schemas EQS Standardized Coefficients, Maximum-Likelihood Parameter Estimates, and Standard Errors

<i>Latent Variable Variances and Covariances</i>					
<i>Schema</i>	<i>Identity</i>	<i>Possessions</i>	<i>Global Self</i>	<i>Identity Ideal</i>	<i>Role</i>
Identity	1 0 64 (13)				
Possessions	31* 28 (10)	1 0 1 21 (24)			
Global self	45* 28 (08)	27* 23 (.10)	1 0 .60 (15)		
Identity ideal	.40* 20 (06)	26* 18 (07)	29* 14 (06)	1 0 39 (.08)	
Role	19 .13 (07)	13 12 (10)	04 03 (07)	43* 22 (06)	1 0 .69 (15)
<i>Factor Loadings^a</i>					
<i>Item</i>	<i>Identity</i>	<i>Possessions</i>	<i>Global Self</i>	<i>Identity Ideal</i>	<i>Role</i>
Active–inactive	0 74 1 0 ^b (—)	0 79 1 0 ^b (—)	0 67 1 0 ^b (—)	0 81 1 0 ^b (—)	0 73 1 0 ^b (—)
Aggressive–passive	– 0 69 – 1.13 (.14)	– 0 75 – .93 (11)	– 0 61 – .93 (16)	– 0.44 – .95 (19)	– 0 70 – 1 09 (15)
Vibrant–still	0 76 1 19 (14)	0 58 70 (11)	0 62 1 01 (17)	0 64 1 22 (18)	0 57 92 (14)
Fast–slow	0 69 1 08 (14)	0 64 .70 (09)	0 63 94 (16)	0 62 1 06 (16)	0 68 1 01 (14)
<i>Residuals (Main Diagonals) and Correlated Errors (Subdiagonal Elements)^c</i>					
<i>Item/Schema</i>	<i>Identity</i>	<i>Possessions</i>	<i>Global Self</i>	<i>Identity Ideal</i>	<i>Role</i>
Active–inactive					
Identity	67 52 (08)				
Possessions	01 01 (07)	61 71 (14)			
Global self	27* 16 (07)	01 01 (.08)	74 72 (12)		
Identity ideal	07 02 (04)	– 10 – 04 (05)	21 08 (05)	58 20 (05)	
Role	14 08 (06)	.14 10 (08)	21 14 (07)	02 01 (05)	68 61 (.11)

TABLE 1 (Continued)

<i>Residuals (Main Diagonals) and Correlated Errors (Subdiagonal Elements)^c</i>					
<i>Item/Schema</i>	<i>Identity</i>	<i>Possessions</i>	<i>Global Self</i>	<i>Identity Ideal</i>	<i>Role</i>
Aggressive-passive					
Identity	73				
	.91 (13)				
Possessions	26*	66			
	.22 (09)	79 (14)			
Global self	37*	18	80		
	33 (09)	15 (09)	90 (.13)		
Identity ideal	40*	37*	.20*	.90	
	47 (12)	40 (11)	.23 (11)	1.50 (.19)	
Role	.26*	30*	13	39*	71
	22 (09)	.24 (09)	11 (09)	43 (11)	82 (13)
Vibrant-still					
Identity	65				
	68 (11)				
Possessions	06	81			
	05 (09)	115 (15)			
Global self	29*	06	78		
	24 (09)	.06 (10)	97 (15)		
Identity ideal	44*	20*	04	77	
	34 (08)	20 (09)	04 (09)	.85 (.12)	
Role	25*	23*	06	50*	82
	22 (09)	27 (11)	.06 (10)	51 (11)	122 (16)
Fast-slow					
Identity	72				
	.81 (12)				
Possessions	20*	76			
	16 (08)	84 (12)			
Global self	.32*	05	78		
	26 (09)	04 (08)	82 (.13)		
Identity ideal	08	.37*	- 02	79	
	.06 (07)	29 (08)	-.01 (.07)	72 (10)	
Role	07	27*	13	55*	73
	06 (08)	22 (08)	10 (08)	42 (.08)	80 (.12)

Note. Overall model fit statistics are $\chi^2(120) = 112.87$, $p = .66$, AGFI = .88. Table entries are the EQS standardized maximum-likelihood parameter estimate (top), the unstandardized parameter estimate (below), with the standard error in parentheses.

^aAll estimated factor loadings exceed twice their standard error.

^bParameter value fixed to 1.

^cMain-diagonal elements are the residuals. Subdiagonal elements are the estimated correlations (covariances) between the residuals of identically worded items. Each residual exceeds twice its standard error.

*Parameter estimate exceeds twice its standard error.

the CFA of Step 1.⁵ Table 2 presents the obtained maximum-likelihood parameter estimates.

The a priori structural model had acceptable overall fit, $\chi^2(124) = 116.70$, $p = .67$, AGFI = .88, $\Delta_2 = 1.0069$; all parameter estimates were reasonable and in the anticipated direction;⁶ each factor loading was statistically significant; and the residuals revealed no patterns characteristic of model misspecification. In addition, the distribution of residuals closely approximated a normal distribution. (Only 2.4%, or 5, of the 210 normalized residuals exceeded 2.0—fewer than would be expected by chance alone, $\alpha = .05$. No normalized residual exceeded 2.3.)

All hypothesized schema relations yielded estimated path coefficients in the expected direction (see Table 2). The coefficients for paths A, C, E, and F were statistically significant. Removing any of these paths from the model produced a statistically significant increase in the overall chi-square statistic.

The proposed link between an identity and its related possessions (path A) was supported ($\beta = .24$, $t = 2.06$, $p < .02$).⁷ The relation between global self and possessions (path B) was in the expected direction, but its coefficient failed to achieve statistical significance ($\beta = .16$, $t = 1.34$, $p < .09$). Trimming this path had trivial impact on overall model fit, $\chi^2_d(1) = 1.75$, $p > .15$. The global self explained little variance in the possessions schema beyond that explained by the identity schema. This finding offers encouraging support for the proposed conceptualization.

The paths from identity ideal to identity ($\beta = .39$, $t = 3.38$; path E) and role to identity ideal ($\beta = .42$, $t = 4.12$; path F) were also statistically significant. However, path D (from role to identity) failed to achieve significance ($\beta = .03$, $t = .27$). Trimming this effect from the model had a trivial effect on model fit, $\chi^2_d(1) = .07$. These findings suggest that identities are premised partly on an identity ideal which is, in turn, premised partly on the associated role schema. That the identity-ideal schema is based on the role

⁵As our use of the same data to assess measure quality and to test structural relations may raise concerns about capitalization on chance, two comments are in order. First, indicator selection criteria were stringent in that we sought a set of identically worded indicators that performed well across the five schemas. Second, we estimated the structural model with all seven items included as indicators for each schema and found results similar to those reported. Thus, capitalization on chance, as a result of using the same data for measure purification and theory testing, is not a likely explanation of our findings.

⁶We estimated a null model identical to the a priori model except that the common method variance was not partitioned out (i.e., error terms of identically worded scale items were not permitted to covary). Fit statistics for this null model were: $\chi^2(164) = 346.3$, AGFI = .75, $\Delta_2 = 8213$; only 8 normalized residuals exceeded 2.0 and all were for pairs of identically worded items. This null model yielded the same pattern of construct relations as the a priori model and the statistical significance (insignificance) of all its estimated parameters was unchanged. The a priori model provided a better fit to the data, $\chi^2_d(40) = 229.6$, $p < .001$.

⁷All parameter estimates are the EQS standardized estimates provided by LINEQS.

TABLE 2
Study 1 Schema Relations. Maximum-Likelihood EQS Standardized Coefficients, Unstandardized Parameter Estimates, and Standard Errors

<i>Path Coefficients</i>						
<i>Path Description (From → to)</i>	<i>Standardized Estimate</i>	<i>Unstandardized Estimate</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>			
A (identity → possessions)	237	326*	158			
B (self → possessions)	162	234	175			
C (identity → self)	467	446*	107			
D (role → identity)	029	023	087			
E (ideal → identity)	393	495*	146			
F (role → ideal)	422	269*	065			
 <i>Schema</i>						
	<i>Identity</i>	<i>Possessions</i>	<i>Global Self</i>	<i>Identity Ideal</i>		
<i>R</i> ² (variance explained)	12	16	22	12		
 <i>Factor Loadings^a</i>						
<i>Item</i>	<i>Identity</i>	<i>Possessions</i>	<i>Global Self</i>	<i>Identity Ideal</i>	<i>Role</i>	
Active–inactive	744 1 0 ^b (—)	795 1 0 ^b (—)	668 1 0 ^b (—)	833 1 0 ^b (—)	727 83 ^c (09)	
Aggressive–passive	– 689 – 1 126 (141)	– 749 – 91 (11)	– 615 – 952 (167)	– 412 – 878 (182)	– 701 – 89 (099)	
Vibrant–still	755 1 184 (140)	581 69 (11)	613 1 005 (179)	623 1 168 (170)	564 754 (104)	
Fast–slow	691 1 071 (138)	638 69 (09)	607 984 (175)	616 1 037 (153)	685 839 (092)	
 <i>Residuals (Main Diagonals) and Correlated Errors (Subdiagonal Elements)^d</i>						
<i>Item/Schema</i>	<i>Identity</i>	<i>Possessions</i>	<i>Global Self</i>	<i>Identity Ideal</i>	<i>Role</i>	
Active–inactive						
Identity	668 521* (085)					
Possessions	010 006 (071)	607 712* (143)				
Global self	267 165* (070)	026 019 (084)	744 733* (124)			
Identity ideal	066 020 (041)	– 071 – 025 (050)	221 080 (048)	554 180* (054)		
Role	143 080 (063)	163 107 (079)	222 149* (074)	02 007 (047)	686 612* (107)	

TABLE 2 (Continued)

<i>Residuals (Main Diagonals) and Correlated Errors (Subdiagonal Elements)^d</i>					
<i>Item/Schema</i>	<i>Identity</i>	<i>Possessions</i>	<i>Global Self</i>	<i>Identity Ideal</i>	<i>Role</i>
Aggressive-passive					
Identity	725				
	907* (132)				
Possessions	306	663			
	218* (091)	802* (137)			
Global self	368	183	788		
	329* (095)	154 (089)	880* (133)		
Identity ideal	397	368	202	911	
	468* (117)	408* (113)	235* (110)	874* (125)	
Role	261	306	122	387	713
	226* (091)	249* (090)	104 (088)	436* (115)	827* (131)
Vibrant-still					
Identity	656				
	686* (113)				
Possessions	062	814			
	055 (089)	1 144* (152)			
Global self	294	055	790		
	242* (091)	059 (102)	991* (150)		
Identity ideal	433	213	062	782	
	335* (085)	212* (096)	058 (091)	874* (125)	
Role	242	234	064	505	826
	221* (094)	277* (111)	070 (106)	522* (108)	1 22* (162)
Fast-slow					
Identity	723				
	811* (118)				
Possessions	062	770			
	162 (082)	841* (117)			
Global self	319	059	795		
	285* (094)	054 (088)	982* (147)		
Identity ideal	090	379	023	788	
	069 (075)	294* (078)	019 (081)	717* (102)	
Role	072	265	149	555	729
	057 (081)	216* (083)	132 (090)	419* (084)	796* (122)

Note Overall fit statistics are $\chi^2(124) = 116.70, p = .67, AGFI = .88$. Table entries are the EQS standardized maximum-likelihood parameter estimate (top), the unstandardized parameter estimate (below), and the standard error (in parentheses).

^aAll estimated factor loadings exceed twice their standard error.

^bFactor loading fixed equal to 1 to identify that factor.

^cThe variance of the role construct was fixed at 1 to identify the factor.

^dMain-diagonal elements are estimated residuals. Sub-diagonal elements are the correlations (covariances) between the residuals of identically worded items.

*Parameter estimate exceeds twice its standard error.

schema fits with the premise that the self is socially derived. It makes sense that the identity-ideal schema might mediate the relation between the role and identity. Because the identity ideal is more personal than the cultural stereotype (role), it may be a more useful or realistic guide for identity development.

Path C (from identity to global self) supports social-identity theory's fundamental tenet that global self derives from the various identities one enacts. We attempted to test for a possible reciprocal path from global self to identity, but identification problems thwarted our efforts to estimate a nonrecursive model that included this reciprocal path.

Finally, we estimated an augmented version of the a priori model. Because consumer researchers sometimes assert a direct relation between the role or ideal constructs and possessions (e.g., Sirgy, 1982), we allowed both these schemas to have direct effects on the possessions schema. Neither path approached statistical significance. The augmented model did not fit the data better than our more parsimonious a priori model, $\chi^2_d(2) = -1.68, p > .25$.

Summary

The data generally support our speculations regarding the relations among the five schemas, demonstrating the utility of social-identity theory. Perhaps the most important finding is that the identity schema, not the global self schema, relates to the possessions schema. This supports the premise that individuals view their possessions through the perspective afforded by an identity, rather than through the global self. Markus and Wurf (1987) put it bluntly: "Among both psychologists and sociologists, an emphasis on the multiplicity or multidimensionality of the self-concept or identity has led to the realization that it is no longer feasible to refer to *the* self-concept" (p. 306). Thus, consumption phenomena might be studied more efficaciously as they relate to an identity rather than to the global self. Moreover, as the athlete identity explains 22% of the variance in the global self,⁸ there is support for the assertion that the global self comprises an individual's social identities.

Our results support and extend Chassin et al.'s (1985) hypothesis that individuals may premise an identity on a representation derived from personal (identity-related) experiences rather than the cultural stereotype represented by

⁸Another study we conducted, using a very different methodology, produced a strikingly similar result. Fifty-seven undergraduate students, similar to those used in Study 1, were provided 100 points with which to represent their self-concept. We asked subjects to allocate the 100 points into four categories: athlete identity, student identity, worker identity, and the rest of their self-concept. Interestingly, in light of the 22% of the global self explained by the athlete identity in our Study 1 data, subjects allocated an average of 19% of their "self points" to the athlete identity. The three identities accounted for an average of 72% of our subjects' self-concept. On average, subjects allocated 38% of the points to the student identity and 15% to the worker identity.

role. The identity ideal, however, appears to be premised in part on the role schema. Combined with our failure to find a significant relation between the role and identity schemas, this suggests that roles are only indirectly related to individuals' possession sets. The functions and origins of the role and identity-ideal schemas appear to be more complex than has been supposed, and these deserve further study. Finally, the generalizability of *all* these findings needs to be investigated across identities.

THE IMPORTANCE OF SALIENCE

Given some understanding of how a person's various self-schemas relate to one another, the fact remains that people differ, not only in terms of the identities they ascribe to themselves but also according to the importance or salience they attach to those identities. These differences can make particular identities more or less prominent in people's self-structures. An additional analysis done on our Study 1 subjects supports this contention.

Identity salience is the relative importance of a given identity in an individual's self-structure (Callero, 1985; McCall & Simmons, 1978; Stryker, 1968, 1980). We measured the salience of the athlete identity for subjects using a four-item version of Callero's (1985) scale,⁹ with responses recorded on 7-point scales ranging from *strongly agree* (7) to *strongly disagree* (1). The items were:

- 1 This is something I rarely think about (reverse scored)
- 2 I would feel at a loss if I were forced to give this up.
- 3 I really don't have any clear feelings about this (reverse scored)
- 4 This is an important part of who I am.

Summing each subject's scores (4 to 28), the sample was separated into high-salience and low-salience groups by a median split. Following Pedhazur's (1982) recommended two-step procedure, we first performed a multivariate analysis of variance to see if subjects' five schemas differed across the high- and low-salience groups. The groups did differ, Wilks's lambda = .77, $F_{\text{exact}}(5, 139) = 8.00, p < .001$, so in the second step we examined the canonical structure coefficients. They tell an interesting story. Coefficients for the identity (.67) and global self (.61) schemas were highly characteristic of the high-salience group, whereas the role schema's coefficient (- .28) was more indicative of the low-salience group. The coefficients for the possessions schema (.24) and for the identity ideal (- .10) did not distinguish the groups. Thus, our high-salience subjects appeared to regard their athlete identity as a prominent

⁹Callero's full scale has five items. We deleted the fifth item after it failed to hold up under CFA performed on pilot study data.

facet of their global self, whereas the low-salience group did not; instead, these individuals regarded the athlete identity as merely a role to be played, not something to be taken all that seriously.

So an identity's salience appears to affect people's self-schemas (and it influences behavior in some way). Indeed, social-identity theorists (e.g., Callero, 1985; McCall & Simmons, 1978; Stryker, 1968, 1980; Stryker & Serpe, 1982) have argued that people's identities are organized into hierarchies and that these are linked to identity-related behavior.

But whence salience? Why does one identity take precedence over another? Several sources are suggested by social-identity theory, as portrayed in Figure 2. First, the salience of an identity (and its schema representation) has been demonstrated to proceed from the *social connections* associated with it. Because we are a particular type of person (cyclist, gardener, etc.), there are certain people we know and with whom we have contact—our social connections. Interactions with these people affect what we *can* become (Callero, 1985; Hoelter, 1983; D. Morgan, 1986; Serpe, 1987; Sommers, 1963; Stryker & Serpe, 1982). For example, Callero (1985) showed that a person's development of social connections linked to voluntary blood donation predicted blood-donor identity salience (which predicted blood donation behavior). Social connections also account for the stability of an identity's salience (Serpe, 1987). For example, a person who bowls weekly with a team has regular opportunities to enact the identity and is expected by teammates to participate. These experiences and expectations help shore up and maintain the identity, even to the extent of making it difficult to dispossess. Path A in Figure 2 depicts the hypothesis that the more extensive one's identity-related social connections, the more salient the corresponding identity.

Second, salience derives from the person's appraisals received from social connections, in the form of *identity-related esteem* (Hoelter, 1983, 1984; Stryker & Serpe, 1982). Simply put, we give prominence to those identities we perform well (see path B). Identity-related esteem reflects a person's self-evaluation with respect to a specific identity (Hoelter, 1983, 1984). In contrast, consumer involvement research (e.g., Zaichkowsky, 1985) suggests the reciprocal relations to paths A and B—that self-relevance *predicts* esteem and social connections. However, Serpe (1987) found that such reciprocal relations were much weaker. This supports social-identity theory's premise that the self is socially derived from situated interaction with others in a network of identity-contingent relationships (Hoelter, 1983; Stryker, 1980; Stryker & Serpe, 1982).

Extending social-identity theory to the consumption setting, we propose several speculative hypotheses, as represented by model paths C, D, and E. Similar to the demonstrated effects of social connections, salience may come from *media connections* related to the identity (Ewen, 1988; Gergen, 1991)—the magazines, books, newspapers, TV programs, and so forth that a person consumes because they are relevant for knowing how to enact an identity. The




FIGURE 2 Antecedents and behavioral consequence of identity salience (with maximum-likelihood parameter estimates) as tested in Study 2. Values are standardized parameter estimates with *t* statistics in parentheses

more extensive these resources, the more they can extend one’s knowledge of the identity beyond the immediate social environment, thus enhancing one’s prowess at effective behavior within the identity (path C). Next (in a chicken-or-egg way), salience proceeds from the extensiveness of one’s *identity-related possessions* (path D), things an individual has that he or she perceives to be related to the identity’s enactment. Inasmuch as activity performance requires enabling products, the more extensive a person’s cluster of identity-related possessions, the more prominent that identity is likely to be for the person. Finally, identity-related possessions, as they are often easily observed, may stimulate identity-related appraisals by others (Belk, 1988; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982); the more cues one provides others, the more favorable such appraisals may be. This implies that the more extensive a person’s cluster of identity-related possessions, the more favorable their identity-related esteem (path E).

The curved arrows (correlations) between the three exogenous variables (possessions, social connections, media connections) acknowledge two things. First, in its current form, the theory does not predict relations between these variables, yet it seems reasonable that they are related. Second, the correlations acknowledge—as they do for any structural modeling exercise—that variables

unexamined in Study 2 may influence the three exogenous variables. For example, marketplace factors (e.g., availability and accessibility of stores carrying identity-relevant paraphernalia, media coverage of identity-related activities) may influence the extensiveness of a person's identity-related possessions or media connections.

Thus, an identity will be more salient when (a) more opportunities exist to enact and receive feedback about the identity (social connections), (b) more identity-relevant possessions and resources are available to enact the identity well (possessions and media connections), and (c) more positive and self-enhancing feedback is received about that enactment (esteem). So salience—what makes one identity more prominent in a person's self-structure than other identities—is something that derives more from social, than from internal, psychological forces. (As we noted earlier, social-identity theory is based largely on a *sociological* orientation to social psychology.) What exactly is the influence of identity salience on our behavior? Empirical findings demonstrate that salience drives the *frequency* with which one performs identity-related behaviors (Callero, 1985; Charng, Piliavin, & Callero, 1988; Nuttbrock & Freudiger, 1991; Stryker & Serpe, 1982). (The assumption prevails, of course, that the identity-related behaviors in question are voluntary.) In other words, we are more likely to do those behaviors representing identities prominent in our self-structure than those reflecting only incidental identities (path F).

STUDY 2. IDENTITY SALIENCE AND BEHAVIOR

To assess the foregoing connection between the salience of an identity (including its presumed precursors) and the frequency of behavior associated with it, we did a second study. Like Study 1, it focused on the athlete identity, but we also included *student* and *worker* identities for the purpose of eliminating the salience of other identities as causal factors. As Garza and Herringer (1987) noted, undergraduate students commonly ascribe these identities to themselves; they are part-and-parcel of their everyday existence.

Method

A total of 204 subjects—also Arizona State University undergraduates, but different from those who participated in Study 1—took part in Study 2. Its procedure followed the general format used in Study 1.

The *salience* of the athlete, student, and worker identities was measured by the four-item version of Callero's (1985) scale already described, worded appropriately for each identity. Coefficient alpha, averaged across the three identities, was an acceptable .74. Each identity's salience is represented by the sum of these four items.

Behavior frequency was measured for each identity by asking: "On average, how often do you do this [identity name here] activity?" Five options were listed, ranging from *never* to *at least once a day*.

The presumed antecedents of identity salience were measured as follows. For *social connections*: "On the lines below list the first name *or* nickname *or* title (e.g., trainer, court scheduler) of those people with whom you do [identity identifier here] or otherwise have contact with or know because of your [identity identifier here]." For *media connections*: "On the lines below, please list any magazines, newspapers, pamphlets, newspaper articles, television or radio programs, lectures or seminars you have read, watched, or listened to over the past 12 months because they were related to [this activity]." For *identity-related possessions*: "Please list the things you own that are related to [this activity]." We operationalized each of these three constructs as, respectively, the number of people, media, or possessions listed. And for *identity-related esteem*: "As one who does this [identity name here] I am . . ." (Five 7-point scales, taken from Hoelter, 1983, followed: positive–negative, important–unimportant, admirable–deplorable, good–bad, successful–unsuccessful.) Based on CFA results, we used only the sum of three of the scales in the analyses: admirable–deplorable, good–bad, and successful–unsuccessful ($\alpha = .85$).

Results

The most salient identity among the three measured was "student," which had a mean of 23.1 (of a possible 28). That was followed by "athlete" (21.3) and "worker" (16.7; all means differed significantly, $p < .01$). This ordering was consistent with our typical subject—a full-time student, who pursued some athletic activity and who worked part time. The behavior frequencies supported this inasmuch as, on average, subjects enacted each of the identities at least once a week. Together, these summary data confirmed the supposition that the student, athlete, and worker identities were part-and-parcel of our subjects' ordinary life.

Yet our subjects construed these identities as separate. Within each identity, salience was significantly ($p < .01$) correlated with behavior frequency— $r = .47$ for student, $r = .33$ for athlete, and $r = .29$ for worker—but none of the correlations were significant across identities (student behavior frequency–athlete behavior frequency = $-.12$, student–worker = $-.04$, and athlete–worker = $-.12$). In addition, the salience of each identity was uncorrelated with that of the other two identities (athlete–student = $.10$, athlete–worker = $-.07$, and student–worker = $.02$). Thus, a person's behavior was driven by the salience of the identity it represented and not by that of other identities. Accordingly, we focus on the salience of the athlete identity (assured that it is not significantly contaminated by other identities) as we consider its antecedents.

Figure 2 depicts the variables in question and shows the obtained EQS normalized maximum-likelihood path coefficients. The model, which was tested by analyzing the implied covariance structure among these six variables, has reasonable overall fit, $\chi^2(6) = 7.8$, $p = .25$, AGFI = .96. The largest normalized residual (1.78) is quite small. All parameter estimates are in the expected direction and all paths are statistically significant, except the one from possessions to identity salience.

Generally, the model supports the suppositions of social-identity theory. Identity-related behavior frequency is predicted by identity salience, and it, in turn, is predicted by the four precursors discussed earlier. Interestingly, identity-related possessions affect salience only indirectly, through identity-related esteem. It seems that simply having the possessions is not enough; what matters is how a person perceives other people's reactions to the use of those possessions. Identity-related esteem captures these reflected appraisals. Apparently, the more identity-related things we have, the more empowered (*ergo* confident) we feel about our ability to perform in the identity.

Summary

Study 2 results appear to support the contention that the prominence of an identity in a person's self-structure influences the frequency with which its related, self-fulfilling behaviors are enacted. This common-sense notion seems related to the psychological construct of motivation, in the sense that we are prone to do those things that appear to reward us. Interestingly, the greater our *capacity* to enact such rewarding behaviors (reflected by the number of our enabling possessions), the more likely we are to feel confident in exercising that capacity—one does according to what one has, as it were. Moreover, the *salience that gives an identity prominence—that makes it self-fulfilling*—has a social genesis; the more external connections (people or media) that support the identity, the more central it is likely to be to our existence. Finally, our various identities not only differ in importance to us, but they also exist separately from one another. No one would deny that identities can be related (some, no doubt, are highly related). But it would be untenable to argue that a person's identities represent a house of cards (change one and all the rest change too).

GENERAL DISCUSSION

We have proposed that—as is commonly supposed—people and products *are* related. A congruity of sorts operates, but the association is by no means simple. Clearly, we need to get beyond glib references to “personality” or “self” if we are to understand how consumers regard products. We have

suggested that people care less about products *qua* products than as instruments that contribute to living. If we want to understand how products fit into consumers' lives, we need look no further than people's ordinary activity patterns.

Social-identity theory has been suggested as a way of looking at consumers because it seems to have a good deal of ecological validity. It recognizes people as multifaceted beings (not lumps of self) who, in the best spirit of rationality, do what they do best. It emphasizes that people are social but does not regard them as neurotic. And it places products in a realistic perspective, as artifacts which enable the many pursuits of people's day-to-day existences. The paradigm appears to be a sensible way to regard consumer behavior.

Two studies were presented and their results are encouraging. We do not claim to have "tested" the social-identity paradigm, but we are not prepared to discard it either. We measured only one identity, using student populations, and we restricted our attention to structural relations. That is a beginning, but no more. Nevertheless, some less-than-outrageous inferences might be drawn—not the least of which has to do with making products "attractive" to people. Our results suggest that an attractive product is one that "fits" consumers in two ways: (a) as part of a *cluster* of products that complement one another (our subjects volunteered how important this factor was), and (b) as a *facilitating* artifact for some identity that is important to people (which gives them a reason to be a consumer). As Douglas and Isherwood (1979) put it so well: "Consumption has to be recognized as an integral part of the same social system that accounts for the need to relate to other people and to have mediating materials for relating to them" (p. 4).

Study Limitations

To map the five schemas in Study 1 into a common semantic space, we followed the standard practice of measuring them on the same bipolar adjective scales (e.g., Hoelter, 1985). We found that, whether we modeled and removed common method variance or not, the statistical significance of each schema relation remained unchanged. Apparently, our results cannot be explained as an artifact of common method variance. This does not rule out possible measurement-procedure effects on the *pattern* of observed relations among the schemas, however.

Consistency bias, as *self-generated validity* (Feldman & Lynch, 1988), is an alternate explanation of the pattern of observed relations among schemas. Self-generated validity occurs when a subject's response to a question is influenced by a response to a preceding question (i.e., the act of measurement produces the thought processes predicted by the theory). A consequence is that correlations supporting the theory being tested may reveal nothing about the phenomenon under investigation. Self-generated validity is more likely: (a) if

a respondent perceives that an answer to a prior question is diagnostic for answering a subsequent question, (b) when that previous answer is accessible while answering the later question, and (c) if other inputs relevant to answering the subsequent question are unavailable or less diagnostic than the prior response.

Self-generated validity is reduced or eliminated when researchers' questions address respondents' "central life interests" (Feldman & Lynch, 1988, p. 430). Such reduction occurs because respondents' cognitions about direct personal experiences (if accessible) are generally more diagnostic of how to answer a question than is their answer to an earlier question. This is important because the social identity probed by our questions is a central life interest to our respondents. Moreover, identities derive from repeated everyday experiences, and individuals tend to develop expertlike schemas (category structures) related to them (cf. D. L. Morgan & Schwalbe, 1990). Our instructions prompting each schema encouraged respondents to make accessible their firsthand knowledge before responding to the scales (see Appendix). Finally, to attenuate the accessibility of prior responses, each schema measure (excepting those for role and identity ideal) was on a separate page of the questionnaire and separated by other questions. From this we conclude that the probability is low that self-generated validity explains the observed pattern of schema relations obtained in Study 1.

Our unit of analysis was an identity, not the specific athletic activity pursued by a respondent. This implies that the nomological relations observed in our two studies apply to the universe of those identities and not to any specific athletic domain (e.g., bowling, curling). Yet we have no reason to doubt that the pattern of relations would be similar across athletic domains (although the magnitude of the path coefficients likely would differ). Similarly, we do not report separate data for males and females for three reasons: (a) Our unit of analysis is the identity, not the specific athletic activity; (b) gender has limited relevance to our research questions; and (c) the social-identity literature affords no hint that identity processes operate differently for men and women. Finally, we caution the reader that our uses of *cause* and *influence* (as in identity-ideal influences identity) reflect statements of predictive validity; these should not be interpreted as assertions of causality in the strict sense.

Future Research

We believe ours is the first study to demonstrate Chassin et al.'s (1985) proposed distinction among identity, identity-ideal, and role schemas. Moreover, the patterns among these schemas clarify previous findings about "actual" and "ideal" selves (e.g., Sirgy, 1982). We found that individuals may base an identity on the identity ideal derived from personal experiences more than on the normative constraints of its social role. Thus, any influence of the so-called

ideal self on consumer behavior may occur indirectly, through its effects on identity. This and other relations among the three identity schemas, their functions and origins, and their effects on consumer behavior deserve further study.

We found that individuals view product sets through the perspective of a corresponding identity instead of through the global self. These identity-related product clusters invite examination of further questions. For example, how do the product sets assembled around each of a person's identities (or extended selves) interrelate? What is the correspondence among product clusters associated with an identity's actual, ideal, and role schemas? How might salience moderate the relation between an identity schema and its corresponding product set?

Finally, social-identity theory raises some interesting questions about marketplace influences on consumer socialization. Consistent with others' work (Belk, 1988; Solomon, 1983; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982), our findings suggest that possessions and consumption are used to obtain the esteem-enhancing feedback necessary for identity development and maintenance. Little is understood, however, about how individuals' access to identity-related products affects identity-related esteem and the trajectory of an identity's development. For example, to what extent does the marketplace provide or constrain opportunities to adopt certain identities? The social-identity paradigm appears to be a useful way to examine how external social and marketplace forces affect how we consume and who we become.

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APPENDIX

Study 1 Instructions Used to Elicit Subjects' Global, Identity, Role, Ideal, and Possessions Schemas

Each schema instruction appeared on a separate page, except where noted. For the *global self schema*

Use each of the following scales to describe yourself *in general* "In general, I consider myself to be active/inactive, aggressive/passive, agitated/calm; fast/slow, vibrant/still, vigorous/relaxed "

To elicit the identity, role, identity-ideal, and identity-related possessions schemas required that we get subjects to focus their thoughts on a specific athletic activity The following instruction (modified from Hoelter, 1983) was used for this purpose

This section asks about you as an *athlete*, a type of person you may regard yourself to be, something that might be an important part of who you consider yourself to be Athlete does not refer solely to organized athletics. This can refer to *any kind of recreational activity* involving physical exertion you engage in or used to engage in Select *one* athletic activity in which you are currently participating (if not currently active, select one in which you have participated in the past) and write it down in the space provided. Please base your answers to questions in this section on this athletic activity only

Then followed the instructions for the (athlete) *identity schema*

Reflect for a moment on your past and present experiences doing the athletic activity you listed. Use each of the following scales to describe *yourself* as someone who does this activity "As someone who does this activity, I consider myself to be: [the seven scales appeared here]"

The role and identity-ideal schema instructions and measures appeared on the same page For the *role schema*

Now think about the *stereotypical person* who does this activity Use each of the scales below to describe this person The stereotypical person who does this activity is [the seven scales appeared here].

For the *identity-ideal schema*

Think about how you would be *ideally* as someone who does this activity and use each of the scales below to describe yourself "As someone who does this activity, ideally I would be. [the seven scales appeared here]."

To elicit the identity-related possessions schema, subjects first listed the "things you personally have because you do this activity " This instruction elicited the *possessions schema*

Reflect on those items just listed that you *own*. Use each of the following scales to describe those items, taken as a whole. "Taken as a whole, these items that I own are [the seven scales appeared here]."
